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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

ARTHUR ANTHONY GONZALES,

:

Defendant/Appellant,

Case No. 20020935-SC

:

INTRODUCTION
Mr. Gonzales files this reply to correct the State's and amicus curiae's erroneous
characterizations of the record and constructions of the law.1 The briefs, like Judge
McCleve's decision below, erroneously attribute sinister motives to the defense and
misrepresent the source and quality of Jessica's psychosis, antisocial behavior,
depression, paranoia, and hatred of Mr. Gonzales. The State and NCVLI provide no
authoritative support for the creation of a constitutional right to notice and a hearing
whenever criminal defendants subpoena complainants' treatment records. The State also
raises several unfounded instances in which the defense purportedly failed to preserve
arguments for appeal. If anything, the State waived the admissibility of Jessica's
allegations of prior sexual misconduct. The record demonstrates that the trial court

l

This brief hereinafter refers to amicus curiae as the National Crime Victim Law
Institute ("NCVLI") and to NCVLFs Brief as "ACB." Appellant's Brief is referred to as
("AB") and the State's brief is noted as "SB."
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I

deprived Mr. Gonzales of his rights to in camera review of the treatment records, choose
his counsel, cross-examine witnesses, and the effective assistance of counsel. These

i

errors, individually and cumulatively, deprived Mr. Gonzales of his right to a fair trial.
I.

THE TRIAL COURT DEPRIVED MR. GONZALES OF
HIS RIGHTS TO IN CAMERA REVIEW AND COUNSEL
OF HIS CHOICE IN MISCONSTRUING THE LAW AND
FACTS ON SUBPOENAING TREATMENT RECORDS.

Contrary to the State's and NCVLI's portrayal of the evidence and the law,

*

I

defense counsel followed this Court's prescribed procedures and acted in good faith in
obtaining Jessica's psychological records. Neither the State nor NCVLI presents any
i
persuasive authority for creating a constitutional right to notice and a hearing for
subpoenaed psychological records. No constitutional right is needed because existing
procedures folly-equip trial judges to address disputes over subpoenaed psychological
records. Moreover, the defense established a reasonable likelihood that the records
contained exculpatory evidence that Jessica fabricated the allegations given her serious

*

psychological disorders and propensity to lie. Judge McCleve's unfounded suspicion of
defense counsel amd misapplication of the law deprived Mr. Gonzales of his
4
constitutional right to maintain his relationship with appointed counsel.
A,

Defense Counsel Followed Applicable Law
and Acted in Good Faith in the Absence of
Legal Precedent

Like Judge McCleve below, the State and NCVLI misapprehend the facts and the
law surrounding the subpoena for Jessica's psychological records. Instead, defense
2
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

^

counsel followed the prescribed procedures for subpoenaing treatment records, including
correctly representing that Jessica's mental state was at issue. When counsel
unexpectedly received the records without a motion to quash, he responsibly safeguarded
them knowing that the trial judge would decide how to proceed. In sum, Judge
McCleve misconstrued defense counsel's actions as deceptive.
1.

The Record and Existing Law
Support Defense Counsel's
Efforts in Subpoenaing and
Obtaining the Treatment
Records

Defense counsel subpoenaed the treatment records in direct compliance with this
Court's instructions in State v. Pliego. 1999 UT 8, 974 P.2d 279. At the outset, NCVLI
incorrectly describes Mr. Gonzales' claim as Pliego somehow mandating criminal
defendants to subpoena witness psychological records. ACB at 18 n.7. Instead, he
simply posits that he followed the procedures detailed in Pliego to subpoena third-party
records directly from record holders rather than the State. IdL at ^f20.
The State and NCVLI further mistakenly fault defense counsel's actions even
though neither Pliego nor any other provision of Utah law address a record holder's
inadvertent disclosure of privileged information. In the absence of any law, defense
counsel acted in good faith and complied with existing law. Contrary to the fraudulent
motives that the State and NCVLI attribute to defense counsel, defense counsel complied
with Pliego and the prosecutor's own instructions "to request th[e] records directly from

3
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4

the provider." R. 211. The prosecutor never requested or even implied that she expected
defense counsel to notify her of the subpoenas. Rather, she stated her intention to seek to

'

quash the subpoenas in the trial court after defense counsel had subpoenaed any records.
Id. The State's complaints about its lack of notice are duplicitous given counsel's

g

adherence to the law and the prosecutor's own representations.
As opposed to the State's speculation that defense counsel intentionally
4
circumvented the law, counsel relied on regular judicial procedures to resolve any
disputes over subpoenas. When defense counsel issued the subpoena, he "anticipated a
motion to quash in response to the subpoena rather than [receiving] the records

^

themselves." R. 259. In the absence of any law, defense reasonably relied on the State's
plan to quash the subpoenas. The trial judge would then intervene and instruct the
parties how to proceed. Defense counsel's actions after receiving the records support
that counsel relied on the trial court to instruct him absent existing law. When counsel
I
learned of UUNI's mistake, he informed counsel for UUNI that he would safeguard the
records because he didn't "want to have anything that's beyond pale." R. 460: 20.
Sound policy supports defense counsel's good faith actions. "Lawyers, as

^

attorneys and counselors at law, are officers of the courts of this state and take a special
oath subjecting them to the Rules of Professional Conduct promulgated by the Utah
Supreme Court." Applied Med. Tech. v. Eames. 2002 UT 18,TJ20,44 P.3d 699.
Accordingly, this Court hesitates to infer attorney misconduct when "there is no
I
4
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evidence, nor any reason to presume" that counsel acted with an unethical or improper
"motive." State v. Arguelles, 2003 UT 1, ^|92, 63 P.3d 731. Because no evidence
supports that defense counsel had any improper motives, the State merely speculates on
appeal that counsel intentionally skirted the law to obtain the treatment records.
2.

Defense Counsel Correctly
Represented that Jessica's
Mental State was at Issue

Similarly, defense counsel accurately informed UUNI that Jessica's mental or
emotional condition were at issue. R. 170. This Court has unequivocally ruled that
under Rule of Evidence 506 "no privilege exists where 'a communication relevant to an
issue of the physical, mental, or emotional condition of the patient in any proceeding in
which that condition is an element of any claim or defense.'" State v. Cardall, 1999 UT
51, TJ29, 982 P.2d 79; see also State v.Blake. 2002 UT 113, ^[18, 63 P.3d 56 (applying
this exception to sexual abuse of a minor); Debrv v. Goates, 2000 UT App 58, f24, 999
P.2d 582 ("this exception applies when any party raises the mental condition of a patient
in a proceeding."). Because this undisputed law placed Jessica's mental condition at
issue, defense counsel correctly represented that this case raised Jessica's emotional state.
Despite these clear directives, the State and NCVLI complain that Jessica's mental
condition was not "an element of any claim or defense." SB at 30-31; ACB at 37-40.
(both quoting Utah R. Evid. 506 (d)(1)). To the contrary, defense counsel articulated
three defense theories based on Jessica's mental state. First, he asserted that Jessica had

5
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"fabricated this story because, given her emotional state, she simply couldn't stand the
idea of having [Mr. Gonzales] governing her life and her mother's life." R. 460: 13,15.

*

Second, Jessica's habitual lying and anti-social behavior, including her prior false
allegation, directly undermined her accusations. IcL_atl8. Third, Jessica's
"psychological state is such that she cannot interpret or perceive information adequately."
IdL at 17-18.
i
The State and NCVLI counter that defenses must be defined by statute. SB at 23;
ACB at 45. This argument leads to the "absurd" conclusion that because Utah law does
not list fabrication or mental illness as statutory defenses, defendants cannot raise those

i

issues at trial. State v. Carruth. 1999 UT 107, |22, 993 P.2d 869. "Fundamental due
process requires that a defendant in a criminal proceeding be allowed to present his or
her theory of defense to the jury. A district court's exclusion of evidence that is an
integral part of the defendant's theory of defense violates due process of law." State v.
4
Bourassa, 15 P.3d 835, 841 (Kan. Ct. App. 1999).
Neither the State nor NCVLI cite any authority for limiting defenses to statutory
definitions. Directly contrary to their assertion, this Court recognized identical defenses

i

in Cardall. Specifically, Cardall claimed that the complainant was "a habitual liar", had
"fabricated her story about being raped," and that "these psychological traits led her to lie
. . . . " 1999 UT 51, Tf29, 982 P.2d 79. Mr. Gonzales' defenses here are indistinguishable.
Because defense counsel properly relied on Jessica's mental state, Judge McCleve
i
6
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clearly erred in finding that counsel acted deceptively. State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44,
TJ17 n.2, 1 P.3d 1108. Despite the State's contentions, Mr. Gonzales marshaled the
pertinent evidence on appeal, including the communications between counsel about
subpoenas, the trial court's instructions not to contact Jessica, and the details surrounding
defense counsel's subpoena and affidavit to UUNI. AB at 25-26. He then explained that
defense counsel correctly followed Pliego and otherwise acted reasonably in the absence
of law on the mistaken disclosure of treatment records. Id. at 25-27. Finally, Mr.
Gonzales detailed Judge McCleve's misunderstanding of defense counsel's actions and
the law and further showed that defense counsel properly obtained and then safeguarded
the psychological records. IcL at 23-27. These facts establish that Judge McCleve clearly
erred. State v. Benvenuto. 1999 UT 60, ^fl3, 983 P.2d 556.
3.

NCVLFs Additional Arguments Lack
Merit

NCVLFs remaining attacks on defense counsel equally lack merit. First,
discovery is not limited to the matters listed in Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 16.
ACB at 43-45. Rule 14 specifically authorizes the use of subpoenas "to produce in court
or to allow inspection of records, papers, or other objects." Utah R. Crim. P. 14(b).
Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has explicitly rejected NCVLFs position in
holding that "any document or other materials, admissible as evidence, obtained by the
Government by solicitation or voluntarily from third parties is subject to subpoena."
Bowman Dairy Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 214, 221 (1951). Consistent with this
7
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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ruling, this Court has repeatedly authorized criminal defendants' subpoenaing treatment
records from third-party record holders. CardalK 1999 UT 8, f20, 974 P.2d 279; Blake,

l

2002 UT 113, Tfl9. 63 P.3d 56; State v. Hansen. 2002 UT 114. ^6. 61 P.3d 1062.
Clearly, subpoenas are well-accepted in criminal cases.

g

Second, NCVLI miscontrues Doe v. Maret, 1999 UT 74, f l 1, 984 P.2d 980.
ACB at 35. That case notes in passing that a privilege results when the privilege holder
i
"intended [the communications] to be confidential at the time they were made." IcL That
case then assesses whether a privilege holder has waived a privilege under Rule of
Evidence 507. IdL at ^f 12-20. That case, in no way, holds that exceptions to privileges

^

do not apply if the holder intended to keep communications private when they were
made. Rather, this Court's discussion of waiver and listing of exceptions to the privilege
at issue confirms that a person can lose the protection of a privilege by the subsequent
occurrence of one of the listed exceptions. IcL at ^}8-20.
i
B.

Complainants Have No Right to Notice or a
Hearing When Others Subpoena Their
Psychological Records.

Utah law does not require criminal defendants to give notice when subpoenaing

^

witnesses' psychological records. Further, neither the State nor NCVLI provide any
authority for creating a due process or privacy right to notice and hearing. The Victims'
Rights Amendment to the Utah Constitution similarly extends no such right to
complainants.
i
8
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1.

The Applicable Rules of
Criminal Procedure Do Not
Require Notice

Despite conceding that the subpoena process under Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure does not require notice, the State invokes the Rules of Civil Procedure
because it contends that Rule of Criminal Procedure 14 is "silent" on notice. SB at 24.
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 81(e) applies the civil rules to "criminal proceedings where
there is no other applicable statute or rule...." Rule of Civil Procedure 45(b)(1)(A)
requires parties to notify the opposing party of subpoenas.
This reasoning ignores that Rule of Criminal Procedure 14 is an "applicable" rule
that "specifically" governs subpoenas in criminal cases. Utah R. Civ. P. 81(e); Utah R.
Crim. P. 31(2). That rule specifically defines parties' duties in subpoenaing documents
or witnesses in criminal cases. Rule 1(c) further mandates that the Rules of Criminal
Procedure "shall govern all criminal proceedings...." Utah R. Crim. P. 1(c). Thus,
when a court rule or statute specifies the procedure in criminal cases, "Rule 81(e) [is]
inapplicable and [] the Rules of Civil Procedure pertaining to discovery may not be used
in criminal cases." State v. Nielsen. 522 P.2d 1366, 1367 (Utah 1974). Because Rule of
Criminal Procedure 14 "govern[s] all criminal proceedings," defendants need not provide
notice of subpoenas to third parties or the State. Utah R. Crim. P. 1(c).
The NCVLI further misconstrues Mr. Gonzales' arguments as "affirmatively
requiring" criminal defendants not to provide notice. ACB at 18. Rather, Mr. Gonzales

9
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argues that because Rule 14 specifically addresses subpoenas and includes no notice
provision, he had no duty to give notice of the subpoena. AB at 23. In apparent

*

agreement, this Court has not required notice in criminal cases.
2.

Defense Counsel Overlooked the
Clause in the Affidavit to UUNI
Concerning Notice

*

Similarly unfounded are the State's and NCVLI's accusations that defense counsel
(

intentionally misrepresented in his affidavit to UUNI that he would notify the State of the
UUNI subpoena. SB at 25, 29-30; ACB at 18 n.6. The context surrounding the
subpoena and affidavit, at most, show inadvertence. Pages three and four of the

I

subpoena extensively detail record holders5 rights to oppose subpoenas and to invoke
privileges. R. 168-69. Rather than showing deception, these disclosures support
counsel's commitment to follow the law. Because the State never raised this argument
below, the record does not address the affidavit's notice clause. But, given the
i
presumption that counsel act ethically, this Court should attribute innocent motives to
defense counsel. Arguelles. 2003 UT 1,1J92, 63 P.3d 731; Eames., 2002 UT 18, f20, 44
P.3d699. Specifically, because defense counsel simply filled out a form affidavit

i

prepared by UUNI, believing that he had accurately represented the situation, his failure
to provide notice was more likely an innocent omission as opposed to wilful misconduct.
Consistent with this view, defense counsel may not have had an opportunity to
provide notice because UUNI informed him of its mistaken disclosure "shortly after11 he
i
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received the treatment records. R. 460: 20. When counsel learned of UNNFs mistake,
notice was no longer needed because UNNI planned to seek to quash the subpoena and
to notify the State in the process. In the absence of "any reason to presume" that counsel
acted with an unethical or improper "motive," this Court should not fault defense counsel
for the lack of notice. ArgueUes, 2003 UT 1,1J92, 63 P.3d 731.
3.

No Due Process Principles
Support Requiring Criminal
Defendants to Provide Notice of
Subpoenas to Third Parties

NCVLI alternatively asks this Court to create a due process right for complainants
to receive notice and a hearing when their psychological records are subpoenaed. ACB
at 5-21. But, NCVLI identifies no authorities establishing a due process right to notice
and a hearing when criminal defendants subpoena complainants' treatment records. The
cases the State cites address clearly established liberty and property interests such as
employment rights, government entitlements such as social security, incarceration, and
access to public information. See, e.g., Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976)
(social security benefits); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (welfare benefits);
Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980) (transferring a prisoner to a psychiatric hospital).
But, none of those cases even remotely address a similar constitutionally-protected
interest in treatment records. Even the principal case NCVLI identifies is readily
distinguishable because it involved the life and death situation of disclosing undercover
police officers' identities. Kallstrom v. City of Columbus, 136 F.3d 1055, 1059 (6 th Cir.
11
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1998).
Rule of Evidence 506 also gives no support to a due process right. That rule does

*

not create a legal entitlement but, rather, establishes a conditional privilege that may not
apply in certain excluded situations, such as here, when a witness's mental condition is at

.

issue. Cardalh 1999 UT 51, TJ29, 982 P.2d 79 (quoting Utah R. Evid. 506(1 )(b)).
Likewise, the federal cases that have found a right to privacy in certain psychological
i
records only provide a conditional right that "must often give way to considerations of
public interest." Daurv v. Smith. 842 F.2d 9, 13 (1 st Cir. 1988).
These cases also fail to support NCVLI's request to create a privacy right to

I

notice and a hearing. This Court concluded in Blake that "the right to a fair trial must be
preserved" over privacy interests. 2002 UT 113, ^[10, 63 P.3d 56. The cases NCVLI
cites offers little help in balancing defendants' and victims' rights because they do not
address criminal defendants' right to a fair trial. Those cases simply beg the question of
4
when does privacy "give way" in criminal cases. Daury, 842 F.2d at 13. Moreover, the
only reported case that appellate counsel could find that addresses a privacy right to
notice and hearing rejected such a right. Commonwealth v. Pelligrini. 608 N.E.2d 717,

4

718-21 (Mass. 1993) (right to privacy does not allow a mother to withhold her newborn
baby's hospital records showing illegal drugs in the baby's body).
Although this Court has defined a general right to privacy, it has no application
here. In Redding v. Brady, 606 P.2d 1193 (Utah 1980), this Court relied on statutes
i
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requiring disclosure of public information and the constitutional rights to free speech,
assembly, and the press to rule that the public's interest in government employees'
salaries overrides a general right to keep one's income private. IcL_ at 1195-97. This
Court has not extended Redding beyond access to public records or ensuring the public's
right to governmental oversight. If anything, Redding's rejection of government
employees' claim to a right keep their salaries private undermines NCVLI's claims.
Other concepts of privacy are equally unavailing. Due process provides for a
privacy right to "personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception,
family relationships, child rearing, and education." Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S.Ct. 2472,
2581 (2003). NCVLI's citations to this line of cases is inapposite.
If anything, Utah law undermines an alleged victim's right to privacy in criminal
cases. In Blake, this Court ruled that "the right to a fair trial must be preserved" over
privacy concerns. 2002 UT 113, ^J10, 63 P.3d 56. Likewise, the Utah Court of Appeals
has observed, "In a criminal context, such as Cardall and Ritchie, due process concerns
limit the extent of an evidentiary privilege because a criminal defendant has a
constitutional right to a fair trial." Debrv. 2000 UT App 58, f27, 999 P.2d 582.
"Fundamental due process requires that a defendant in a criminal proceeding be allowed
to present his or her theory of defense to the jury." Bourassa, 15 P.3d at 841. Thus,
privacy interests do not "alter the fundamental principles on which our legal system is
based." People v. Nestrock. 735 N.E.2d 1101, 1109 (111. App. Ct. 2000).

13
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i
4.

The Victims9 Rights Amendment
to the Utah Constitution
Contains No Express or Implied
Support For Creating A
Constitutional Right to Notice
and a Hearing

^

NCVLI similarly fails to support creating a constitutional right to notice and a
hearing under the Victims' Rights Amendment ("VRA") to the Utah Constitution. Utah
Const, art. I, §28 (Supp. 2003); ACB at 21-32. Because the VRA fails to require any

<

specific procedures, NCVLI requests this Court to fashion "unarticulated rights." ACB
Brief at 22. NCVLI relies on subsection (l)(a) of the VRA, which provides crime
i
,f

victims the right [t]o be treated with fairness, respect, and dignity, and to be free from
harassment and abuse throughout the criminal justice process." Id_ at §(l)(a). NCVLI
asks this Court to take an enormous leap of logic to construe the rights to fairness and
freedom from abuse as requiring notice and a hearing whenever a criminal defendant
subpoenas a complainant's treatment records.

4

Again, NCVLI cites no supporting authority for fairness to victims requiring a
constitutional right to notice and a hearing. Courts that have construed statutory or
i
constitutional victims' rights provisions have concluded that the right to a fair trial
prevails over privacy concerns and that these provisions do not "alter the fundamental
principles on which our legal system is based." Nestrock, 735 N.E.2d at 1109; see. Hult
v. Romlev. 987 P.2d 218, 222 (Ariz. 1999); Benton v. Superior Court. 897 P.2d 1352,
1354 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994). Likewise, this Court specifically held in Blake that fair trial
14
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rights prevail when resolving tensions between victims and criminal defendants under
the VRA. 2002 UT 113,^jl0, 63 P.3d 56.
In any event, NCVLI appears to overstate its concerns for abuse. By establishing
an exception for a person's mental state under Rule of Evidence 506, the legislature
purposefully provided complainants less protection in keeping their records private. This
policy determination expresses a reduced concern for abuse when, as here, a defense or
claim depends on the complainant's mental state. In addition, as "officers of the court11
defense attorneys can be expected to use witness psychological information ethically and
within the bounds of the law. Eames, 2002 UT 18, ^[20, 44 P.3d 699.
5.

Existing Procedures Fully
Protect Privacy Interests in
Treatment Records

This Court need not create a constitutional right to notice and a hearing because
existing remedies adequately protect privacy interests. NCVLI lists a parade of horribles
absent a right to privacy over psychological records, including chilling patients'
willingness to confide in professionals and discouraging the reporting of crimes. ACB
brief at 10-12. These fears are unfounded because this Court has already weighed these
concerns when it established the in camera review procedure in Cardall. According to
this Court, Cardall "represents a satisfactory method of balancing the interests of privacy
and full reporting of crime with defendants1 ability to present the best case at trial."
Blake. 2002 UT 113, f23, 63 P.3d 56.

15
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Given this balancing of interests, this Court should not resort to creating an
unnecessary due process right. As this Court held in Blake, this Court seeks nto avoid

^

constitutional interpretation where possible. .. ." Id. at ^16 (quoting Preuss v.
Wilkerson. 858 P.2d 1362, 1362-63 (Utah 1993)). The VRA's general references to
respectfully treating alleged victims adds little, if anything, to the due process equation.
In fact, because the in camera review process accommodates privacy concerns, the VRA
i
is not needed to protect NCVLPs concern for fairness and abuse.
Although Cardall does not address mistakenly released treatment records, the
proceedings below demonstrate that trial courts can adequately address wrongful

<

disclosures. Trial courts learn of mistakenly released records from the record holder, the
State, or the patient. Although Judge McCleve erroneously penalized the defense below,
this case shows that if the defense misuses treatment records or wrongfully obtains them,
judges can exclude evidence from trial or otherwise sanction the defense.
Despite the State's and NCVLI's protestations, the mere receipt of treatment
records is insufficient, in itself, to warrant sanctions. This conclusion is particularly
applicable here given defense counsel's good faith efforts in the absence of law on the

i

wrongful disclosure of treatment records. Once UUNI informed counsel that it had
mistakenly released the records and would seek to quash the subpoena, counsel
responsibly secured the records until the trial judge could decide their use. R. 460: 17.
Further, because defense already knew of Jessica's mental condition, except for the
i
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hallucinations, the seriousness of the breach of privacy was minimal. State ex. rel. v.
Sanders, 575 S.E.2d 864, 871 (W.V. 2002). In any event, Judge McCleve could have
adequately dealt with this disclosure by prohibiting the use of the hallucinations in the
defense request for in camera review or at trial.
The arguments for creating constitutional rights also divert this Court's attention
from the actual source of the problem in this case: UUNPs failure to secure privileged
information. The Utah Court of Appeals has established that doctors and therapists have
a duty to "protect the confidentiality of [] patients." Debrv, 2000 UT App 58,1J28, 999
P.2d 582. This duty includes providing patients notice before disclosing confidential
records. Id

"Such notice ensures that the patient can pursue the appropriate procedural

safeguards in court to avoid unnecessary disclosure." IdL_ Through civil actions and the
threat of damages, patients can assert their privacy rights as well as deter the wrongful
release of information. See Stien v. Marriott Ownership Resorts, Inc., 944 P.2d 374, 377
(Utah Ct. App. 1997). Responsibility for the mistaken release of Jessica's treatment
records lies with UUNI, not defense counsel and his efforts to follow the law.
6.

Should This Court Create a
Constitutional Right to Notice
and A Hearing, That Right Does
Not Apply in This Case

Even if this Court were to create a due process right to notice and a hearing, this
Court should only apply that right prospectively. This Court is "reluctant to give []
retroactive effect" to its decisions when it has "adopted a new rule that is of a
17
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constitutional dimension." State v. Gordon. 913 P.2d 350, 354 (Utah 1996). This Court
applies new rights prospectively when the rule is "prophylactic" in seeking to prevent

'

"recurrence" of a problem. Labrum v. Utah State Bd. of Pardons, 870 P.2d 902, 913-14
(Utah 1993); State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 853 (Utah 1992). Likewise, establishing a
"substantive" constitutional right to notice and a hearing favors prospective application.
Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 45 (1990). Retroactive application risks creating a
i
"'substantial injustice'" by unfairly penalizing Mr. Gonzales in the absence of established
law on wrongful disclosures. State v. Saunders, 1999 UT 59, ^[53, 992 P.2d 951 (quoting
Heslop v. Bank of Utah. 839 P.2d 828. 835 (Utah 1992)).
C.

i

The Defense Established a Reasonable
Likelihood That Jessica's Treatment Records
Contained Exculpatory Evidence

Judge McCleve further erred in incorrectly concluding that defense counsel learned
of Jessica's mental disorders through the UUNI records. R. 262. The record establishes
I
that Mr. Gonzales had prior knowledge of Jessica's numerous psychological disorders.
Most telling, Mr. Gonzales' attendance at a therapy session with Jessica and his pro se
motion prior to defense counsel's appointment verify his knowledge. R. 46, 257-58.

i

Having essentially lived together Jessica and her mother as a family for several months, he
witnessed Jessica's jealousy, hatred, habitual lying, and criminal behavior. R. 257-58.
After defense counsel was appointed, counsel's "independent investigation" confirmed
Jessica's two or three stays at a psychiatric hospital "due to psychotic disorders",
i
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"antisocial behavior", "repeated history of being dishonest", "serious depression" and
"paranoid" thoughts. R. 192-93,257-58,460: 12-14, 18,21. As these facts demonstrate,
Judge McCleve clearly erred in concluding that defense counsel's knowledge of Jessica's
severe psychological disorders came "directly" from the UUNI records. R. 262; see
Benevnuto, 1999 UT 60, ^[13, 983 P.2d 556; R. 262.
Jessica's numerous other psychological disturbances established a "reasonable
certainty" that the UUNI records contained exculpatory evidence which undermined
Jessica's veracity and ability to perceive reality. Blake, 2002 UT 113, ^|19, 63 P.3d 56.
Both Mr. Gonzales' personal knowledge and defense counsel's independent investigation
constituted "extrinsic indications] that the evidence within the records exists and will, in
fact, be exculpatory." Id Mr. Gonzales', Beth's, and LaToya's agreement that Jessica
had falsely accused Mr. Gonzales of touching her on a previous occasion further support
in camera review under Cardall. 1999 UT 51,1J34, 982 P.2d 79.
The trial court record also fails to support Judge McCleve's conclusion that the
defense merely speculated that the UUNI records contained impeachment evidence. R.
263, 460: 18. Far more than speculation, the facts provided "extrinsic evidence of some
disorder that might lead to uncertainty regarding [Jessica's] trustworthiness." Blake, 2002
UT 113, TJ22, 63 P.3d 56. Despite Blake's dicta doubting whether "impeachment
evidence" would justify in camera review, Jessica's disturbed condition was far more than
mere impeachment material. 2002 UT 113, ^[19 n.2, 63 P.3d 56. In any event, the United
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States Supreme Court has ruled that "impeachment evidence" supporting acquittal is
"exculpatory" under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), and must be given to the

^

defense. Kvles v. Whitley. 514 U.S. 419, 505 (1995).
It is well-settled that "[t]he use of a witness's mental condition for impeachment

.

purposes is proper if there is an indication that the mental condition affected [1] the truth
of his [or her] testimony" or "[2] the witness's ability to observe and relate matters to
i
which he [or she] testifies." State v. Dumaine. 783 P.2d 1184, 1198 (Ariz. 1989).
Jessica's psychosis, antisocial behavior, paranoia, and other impairments directly
supported Mr. Gonzales' defenses of fabrication and misperception. Because Jessica "has

^

a history of mental illness relevant to [her] ability to accurately report on the assault", in
camera review was required Blake, 2002 UT 113, f21, 63 P.3d 56. This Court can
resolve any questions about the UUNI records by reviewing them in camera.
D.

Judge McCleve's Erroneous Findings of Facts
and Conclusions Deprived Mr. Gonzales of His
Right to Choose His Counsel

(

Judge McCleve's misapplication of the law and unfounded finding of a conflict
deprived Mr. Gonzales of his right to choose his counsel. Initially, the State mistakenly

<

complains that Defense counsel invited this error. To the contrary, Judge McCleve gave
defense counsel no other option under the Rules of Professional Conduct but to withdraw.
The right to choose one's counsel bars interference with and provides a right to retain an
existing relationship with appointed counsel. Because defense counsel had no conflict
i
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with Mr. Gonzales, Judge McCleve unconstitutionally interfered with the right to counsel.
1.

Defense Counsel Did Not Waive
Mr. Gonzales' Right to Choose
His Counsel Because Judge
McCleve's Decision Ethically
Required Him to Withdraw

The State mischaracterizes the record when it asserts that defense counsel
"affirmatively waived any claim about his removal" by withdrawing from the case. SB at
42. To the contrary, Judge McCleve forced defense counsel to remove himself by
baselessly informing defense counsel that "apparently you can't be trusted." R. 460: 18.
Similarly, in her written ruling on access to the treatment records, Judge McCleve
concluded that "counsel appears to have created a conflict that calls into question the
professional ethics of his continued representation of the defendant." R. 266.
Judge McCleve's doubts about defense counsel's "ethics" required counsel to
remove himself under the Rules of Professional Conduct. Rule 1.16 mandates that a
"lawyer shall not represent a client or, where representation has commenced, shall
withdraw from the representation of a client, if: The representation will result in violation
of the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law...." Judge McCleve's false
conclusion that defense counsel had misrepresented that Jessica's mental state was at issue
required withdrawal under Rule 4.1. That rule prohibits lawyers from making "a false
statement of material fact to a third person

" Utah R. Prof. Cond. 4.1(a).

Similarly, Rule 1.7 forbids lawyers from representing "a client if the representation
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of that client may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to . . . a third
person or by the lawyer's own interest. .. ." Utah R. Prof. Cond. 1.7(b). Judge

'

McCleve's doubts about defense counsel's conduct undermined her confidence in him,
thereby calling into question counsel's ability "to represent the interests of [his] client

|

with zeal and loyalty." State v. Holland. 876 P.2d 357. 359 (Utah 1994). The judge's
comments also jeopardized counsel's standing before the state bar association. Because,
i
these competing interests "materially limited" defense counsel's ability to represent Mr.
Gonzales, Rule 1.7(b) barred defense counsel from representing Mr. Gonzales.
Moreover, the context surrounding defense counsel's statement that "to a large

*

extent I agree with" Judge McCleve's findings of misconduct shows that no waiver
occurred here. A party waives the opportunity to raise an issue on appeal when defense
counsel "consciously chose not to object... and then affirmatively" represented the
correctness of the trial court's decision. State v. Anderson. 929 P.2d 1107, 1109 (Utah
1996). Counsel's statement did not "affirmatively" lead Judge McCleve to err because he
expressed his partial agreement after the judge had already concluded that counsel
intentionally skirted the law. Prior to defense counsel's partial agreement, he vigorously
defended his actions in his written motions and statements in court. In contrast to defense
counsel's objections, waiver requires "a consciously chosen strategy of trial counsel rather
than an oversight." State v. Bullock. 791 P.2d 155, 158-59 (Utah 1989). Defense counsel
could not have "consciously" led Judge McCleve to error when the judge's own false
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conclusions compelled him to withdraw. Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1109.
This case is similar to State v. Griffin. 754 P.2d 965, 967 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), in
which defense counsel filed a pretrial motion to suppress and repeatedly objected to the
admission of an interview transcript. At trial, following an off-the-record discussion,
defense counsel stated that the prosecutor had agreed to amend the transcript during the
lunch recess. Id Defense counsel later stipulated to the admission of the amended
transcript, h i The Court of Appeals cited this Court's ruling in State v. Johnson, 748
P.2d 1069, 1071 (Utah 1987), that parties need not renew pretrial motions at trial when
the same trial judge presided at the motion hearing. The Court then found no waiver
based on Johnson together with the "defendant's initial objection and his continued
assertion" of the inadmissibility of the transcript. Griffin, 754 P.2d at 968. Similarly,
Judge McCleve presided at all relevant proceedings here, defense counsel argued that he
had not fraudulently obtain the treatment records, and he maintained his arguments in his
written motions. As in Griffin, no waiver occurred under these circumstances.
2.

The Right to Choose Counsel
Includes the Right to Preserve
Existing Relationships With
Appointed Counsel

The State also misconstrues the right to choose one's counsel. Although indigent
defendants have no right to have the trial court appoint defendant's counsel of choice, the
right to choose one's counsel encompasses the right to "preserve" an existing relationship
with appointed counsel, State v. Huskev. 82 S.W.3d 297, 305 (Term. Crim. App. 2002):
23
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[T]he attorney-client relationship... involves not just the casual
assistance of a member of the bar, but an intimate process of
consultation and planning which culminates in a state of trust
and confidence between the client and his [or herjattorney. This
is particularly essential, of course, when the attorney is
defending the client's life or liberty. Furthermore, the
relationship is independent of the source of compensation, for an
attorney's responsibility is to the person he has undertaken to
represent rather than to the individual or agency which pays for
the service. It follows that once counsel is appointed to represent
an indigent defendant, whether it be the public defender or a
volunteer private attorney, the parties enter into an attorneyclient relationship which is no less inviolable than if counsel had
been retained. To hold otherwise would be to subject that
relationship to an unwarranted and invidious discrimination
arising merely from the poverty of the accused.

4

i

Smith v. Superior Court, 440 P.2d 65, 74 (Cal. 1968) (internal citations omitted); see also
Commonwealth v. Jordan. 733 N.E.2d 147, 152 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000); People v. Alvin .
547 N.W.2d 65, 69 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996).
This Court's decision in Arguelles fully supports this reasoning. Arguelles
protested that the trial court had deprived him of his right to choose counsel when it

i

removed his appointed attorney with whom he "had established a relationship of trust."
2003 UT 3, |86, 63 P.3d 731. Although this Court ruled that appointed counsel had a
conflict of interest that precluded representation, this Court reviewed the merits of
defendant's claim to keep his appointed counsel. IcL_ at f ^|86, 91. This Court's
recognition of the defendant's argument is entirely consistent with and recognizes a right
to preserve relationships with appointed counsel of choice.
•

>

i
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3.

Judge McCleve Erroneously
Concluded That Defense
Counsel's Knowledge of the
Treatment Records Created a
Conflict of Interest

Judge McCleve had no grounds for removing defense counsel in violation of Mr.
Gonzales' right to preserve his appointed lawyer's representation. Judge McCleve clearly
erred in finding that defense counsel had a conflict that required his withdrawal.
Gamblin. 2000 UT 44, ^[17 n.2, 1 P.3d 1108. The only conflict that existed was the one
created by Judge McCleve's erroneous view of the law and defense counsel's conduct.
Judge McCleve simply adopted the prosecutor's unfounded assumption that defense
counsel fraudulently obtained the treatment records in violation of law. " A defendant in a
criminal case may not be denied his [or her] constitutional right to counsel of his [or her]
choice on the basis of a totally unsupported 'belief by the government that counsel has a
conflict of interest." United States v. Reese, 699 F.2d 803. 805 (6th Cir. 1983V
Defense counsel's obtaining of the treatment records and his review of them were
entirely consistent with Mr. Gonzales' interests. Counsel need only withdraw when
counsel has "conflicting interests" with the client. People v. Newell, 481 N.E.2d 1238,
1243 (111. App. Ct. 1985). But, obtaining potentially exculpatory documents for a client's
defense does not constitute "inconsistent obligations." IdL. If anything, defense counsel's
knowledge of Jessica's psychotic condition and habitual lying enhanced his confidence in
and understanding of Mr. Gonzales' claims of innocence.
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This case is similar to Newman v. State, 2003 Md. App. LEXIS 168, in which the
defendant sought to disqualify the prosecuting agency because the prosecution had partly

'

built its case on facts learned from the defendant's privileged attorney-client records. IcL_
at 6-7. The Maryland court held that even if the prosecutor had reviewed privileged

\

material, "the proper remedy would be to bar use of the material at trial, not to disqualify
the State's Attorney's office." Id. at 20. The court likened the prosecutor's knowledge to
K
facts gleaned from an illegally obtained confession. Ll_ Even though the prosecution
"gained insight. . . that it would otherwise not have had" from the confession, that
knowledge did not require disqualification. Id_

^

This reasoning applies equally to defense counsel's knowledge of Jessica's
treatment records. Any knowledge improperly gained from the records can be excluded
just like any other forms of evidence, such as a complainant's prior sexual history or
criminal activities, that would be barred by the Rules of Evidence. See, e.g. Utah R.
i
Evid. 404(b) (prior bad act evidence); Utah R. Evid. 412 (prior sexual history). Judge
McCleve's denial of Mr. Gonzales' right to retain appointed counsel requires reversal as a
matter of law. United State v. Santos, 201 F.3d 953, 960 (7 th Cir. 2000).
II.

^

<

DEFENSE COUNSEL PRESERVED AND SUPPORTED
MR. GONZALES' CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO
CROSS-EXAMINE JESSICA AND ANJALI ABOUT
THEIR MOTIVES TO LIE.

The State omits the parties' essential arguments in asserting that Mr. Gonzales5
subsequent trial counsel failed to preserve his right to cross-examination. Like defense
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counsel's partial agreement with Judge McCleve's ruling, trial counsel's reference to Rule
of Evidence 609 came after the trial judge had already misconstrued the law and
erroneously barred essential cross-examination. Trial counsel's repeated, specific, and
correct explanation of the right to cross-examination afforded the trial judge multiple
opportunities to correctly decide the issues. The context of trial counsel's statements
shows that she did not waive this issue for appeal.2
The State needlessly raises the failure to preserve an argument under Rule of
Evidence 608(c). SB at 46-53. Trial counsel specifically requested cross-examination
based on the "sixth amendment" "right to cross-examine" witnesses about "possible bias,
of the witness; credibility issues and any prejudice [they] may have by testifying against
the defendant." R. 464: 150-54; 465: 158-59. In support, trial counsel repeatedly cited
Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 0974). R. 465: 159.
Because trial counsel "'distinctly stated'" her grounds supporting her
Confrontation Clause claims, she preserved her challenges for appeal. State v. Cantu, 750
P.2d 591, 594 (Utah 1988). Mr. Gonzales' single citation in his appellate brief to Rule of
Evidence 608(c) does not defeat preservation. AB at 39. That citation merely supported
his claimed constitutional right. The State's discussion of Rule 608(c) is irrelevant.
The record further shows that trial counsel correctly explained the law and in no

2

This brief summarizes the arguments on the right to cross-examination and
includes the transcript of the relevant proceedings in the Addendum.
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way led the trial judge into error. Counsel correctly explained that Davis established a
"right to cross-examine a juvenile offender who has been convicted of an offense,

*

especially one of dishonesty, as I said for impeachment purposes." R. 464: 150. In
response, the trial judge conceded, "I don't know if I understand" the law on this subject.
R. 464: 151. The prosecutor tried to educate the judge by accurately explaining that the
convictions here for retail theft were not admissible under Rule of Evidence 609 because
(

they did not involve honesty as required under the rule. R. 464: 151-52; s_ee_ Utah R.
Evid. 609; State v. Brown. 771 P.2d 1093, 1094 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Trial counsel clarified her argument by stating that "Davis doesn't limit

*

impeachment with only crimes of dishonesty. It covers all crimes, not just those of
dishonesty." R. 464: 152. When the prosecutor reasserted her reliance on Rule 609, the
trial judge abruptly concluded "609, then, is our operative rule." R. 464: 152-53. Despite
his conclusion, the trial judge offered to read Davis during the overnight recess to
i

determine if that case contains "a constitutional underpinning [] that constitutionally
allows you to ask the question of any juvenile adjudication... ." R. 464: 153.
The next morning, trial counsel repeated her argument that Davis provided a right
to cross-examine witnesses about "possible bias, of the witness; credibility issues and any
prejudice [they] may have by testifying against the defendant", including a witness's
probation status. R. 465:159. When the trial judge asked trial counsel if she was
"referring to 609", she responded, "Yes. Thank you." R. 465: 159. The trial judge
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i

immediately denied trial counsel's motion because trial counsel had requested "a
modification of the general rule" under Rule 609. R. 465: 160. The trial judge concluded
that Rule 609 controlled over Davis and that parties could only impeach witnesses,
including juveniles, with evidence of "a felony or a crime of dishonesty." R. 465: 16061. The trial judge distinguished Davis as applying only to "the relevance of a prior
criminal situation in the context of the facts of a particular case. . . . " IcL at 160.
Following the judge's ruling, trial counsel requested "the benefit of the record for
purposes of appeal, if there is one?" Id. at 161. The trial judge denied the request and
instructed counsel to present her arguments "to the Court of Appeals." IdL. When trial
counsel renewed her request to "preserve" her objections, the trial judge concluded that
"the record is clear" and that trial counsel had adequately "preserved" her objections. IdL
As these proceedings show, trial defense did not lead the trial judge to error.
Rather, trial counsel identified the applicable law, corrected the prosecutor's and the trial
judge's misunderstanding that Rule 609 limited Davis, and explicitly stated that Davis
"covers all crimes, not just those of dishonesty." R. 464: 152. Given trial counsel's sole
reliance on the right to confrontation throughout the discussions, she appears to have
either misspoken or misunderstood when she agreed with the trial judge's reference to
Rule 609. R. 465: 159. In support, trial counsel arguments immediately preceding this
comment address Davis and the constitutional right to cross-examine witnesses about bias
or motive. R. 465: 158-59. Trial defense's slip up was, at most, an "oversight" rather
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i

than "a consciously chosen strategy" which invited error. Bullock, 791 P.2d at 158-59.
The context of trial counsel's statements show she did not mislead the judge, but,

'

rather, the trial judge failed to comprehend trial counsel's correct legal analysis of Davis .
Upon initially hearing trial counsel's arguments, the trial judge stated himself that he did

.

not "understand" the law. R. 464: 151. He then erroneously concluded that Rule 609 was
"operative." IdL at 153. The trial judge's immediate rejection of trial counsel's argument
(

the next day establishes that he had already made up his mind that Rule 609 controlled
and the his reading of Davis did not change his mind. R. 464: 152-53; R. 465: 160.
The trial judge erred and misread Davis. That case clearly holds that the right to

*

cross-examination supercedes the limits in Rule 609:
The introduction of evidence of a prior crime is thus a general
attack on the credibility of the witness. A more particular attack
on the witness' credibility is effected by means of crossexamination directed toward revealing possible biases,
prejudices, or ulterior motives of the witness as they may relate
directly to issues or personalities in the case at hand. The
partiality of a witness is subject to exploration at trial, and is
"always relevant as discrediting the witness and affecting the
weight of his testimony." 3 A J. Wigmore, Evidence §§ 940, p.
775 (Chadbourn rev. 1970). We have recognized that the
exposure of a witness1 motivation in testifying is a proper and
important function of the constitutionally protected right of
cross-examination. Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496
(1959).
Davis v. Alaska. 415 U.S. 308. 316-317 (1974V

j

^

l

Because the trial judge misunderstood the law when he asked trial counsel about
Rule 609, trial counsel's mistaken agreement had no effect on the trial judge's decision.
30
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

J

Counsel's consistent reliance on Davis and her attempts to correct the trial judge's
understanding sufficiently preserved her arguments. No waiver occurs when the same
trial judge addresses a disputed issue, counsel initially objects, and then maintains the
objection throughout the discussion of the issue. Griffin, 754 P.2d at 968. Trial counsel
did not "consciously" or "affirmatively" lead the trial court to err. Anderson, 929 P.2d at
1109. In any event, trial counsel's specific arguments coupled with the judge's misreading
of Davis despite an overnight recess fully satisfied the preservation rule's requirement to
provide the trial judge an "opportunity" to correctly decide the issue. State v. Cram, 2002
UT 37410, 46 P.3d 230.
Even had trial counsel not preserved her arguments, the trial judge's refusal to
afford trial counsel an opportunity to place her objections on the record excused any
waiver. This Court recently reiterated that trial judges may not "'act so abruptly . . . that
defendant's counsel had no opportunity to object.'" State v. Cram, 2002 UT 37, TJ12, 46
P.3d 230 (quoting State v. Ambrose. 598 P.2d 354, 360 (Utah 1979)). The trial judge's
refusal to allow trial counsel to place additional arguments on the record and to clarify her
objection, likewise, denied her an "opportunity" to fully preserve her arguments. Id.
The trial judge's denial of Mr. Gonzales' right to cross-examine Jessica and Anjali
about their juvenile records and their "current" custody status undermines the jury's
verdict. State v. Chavez. 2002 UT App 9,1J20, 41 P.3d 1137. The State's conclusory
argument that Mr. Gonzales can only speculate about Jessica's and Anjali's biases
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overlooks that Mr. Gonzales need only show "p ossible biases, prejudices, or ulterior
motives." Davis, 415 U.S. at 316. As explained in the opening brief, Jessica and Anjali
had numerous motives to lie and their testimony was pivotal in this close credibility
contest. AB at 41-42. This evidence prevents any showing of harmlessness beyond a
reasonable doubt. State v. Hackford. 737 P.2d 200, 204 (Utah 1987).
III.

THE PROSECUTOR WAIVED THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
JESSICA'S PRIOR ALLEGATIONS AS PRIOR BAD
ACTS AND COMPLICATED THIS COURT'S REVIEW
BY FAILING TO FOLLOW THE TRIAL JUDGE'S
INSTRUCTIONS TO RENEW HER ARGUMENTS
DURING TRIAL.

The State does not contest that trial counsel opened the door to Jessica's prior
allegations. State's Brief at 57-59. Rather, the State asserts that trial counsel's error did
not prejudice Mr. Gonzales because Jessica's allegations of prior sexual acts were
admissible under Rule of Evidence 404(b). SB at 61-64. But, the failure to renew an
objection when the trial court directs waives objections on appeal:
[W]hen a court properly defers ruling on an issue that has
been raised and plainly instructs the objecting party to re-raise
the issue at a specific later time if its objection remains, the
f
'court[] [is] not [then] required to constantly survey or secondguess [that] party's best interests or trial strategy." [State v.]
Labrum, 925 P.2d [937,] 939 [(Utah 1996)]. Rather, the
requirement of a timely objection to preserve the issue for review
is renewed under the terms set forth by the trial court. In essence,
if no such later objection is made, the party has not "presented
[the issue] to the trial court in a manner sufficient to obtain a
ruling thereon," thereby preserving the issue for review. Buehner
[Block Co. v. UWC Assocs.]. 752 P.2d [892,] 894 n.2 [(Utah
1988)].
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State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 114, 1J16, 61 P.3d 1062. This ruling applies to all parties. IcL_
The trial judge below specifically instructed the parties to renew their arguments
about prior bad acts because he could not adequately determine the admissibility of
Jessica's allegations until the State presented its evidence. R. 464: 15-16. Despite this
directive, the prosecutor did not renew her arguments under Rule 404(b). Instead, she
only argued that trial counsel opened the door to the admissibility of Jessica's prior
allegations. R. 466: 484. The failure to renew the objection "under the terms set forth by
the trial court" bars appellate review. Hansen, 2002 UT 114,1J16, 61 P.3d 1062.
Moreover, the prosecutor's failure to renew her arguments, presents this Court with
a difficult task. Even if Jessica's allegations supported criminal intent, this Court has
cautioned trial judges about prior bad acts' "powerful tendency to mislead the finder of
fact." State v.Saunders, 1999 UT 59, f 15, 992 P.2d 951. Moreover, "[i]t is fundamental
to our law that a person may be convicted criminally only for his acts, not for his general
character . . . or propensity to commit bad acts." Id, Given the prejudicial effect of prior
bad acts, "admission of prior crimes evidence itself must be scrupulously examined by
trial judges." IdL at Tjl 8. The prosecutor's failure to preserve her arguments deprives this
Court of a scrupulous examination to review. Instead, the State merely speculates that the
trial judge "would have likely" admitted the evidence. SB at 61. This Court should reject
the State's claim on appeal.
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IV.

BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE OF CHILD SUPPORT
ARREARS WAS IRRELEVANT TO ESTABLISHING AN
ISSUE OF ANY CONSEQUENCE, TRIAL COUNSEL
WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR WITHDRAWING HER
OBJECTION TO THE ADMISSION OF THIS EVIDENCE.

Contrary to the State's attempts to distinguish State v. LeVasseur, 854 P.2d 1022

*

^

(Utah Ct. App. 1993), and State v. Martinez. 848 P.2d 702, 705 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), the
rationale of those cases supports excluding evidence of Mr. Gonzales' child support
arrears. SB at 65. Those cases upheld the exclusion of specific acts of misconduct
because the proposed evidence was not '"relevant for some purpose other than
contradicting testimonies. . . .'" Martinez, 848 P.2d at 705; (quoting United States v.
Phillips, 888 F.2d 38, 41 (6th Cir. 1989)). Stated differently, the proposed evidence
"interjected an irrelevant issue." IdL; LeVasseur, 854 P.2d at 1024.
The child support arrears similarly raised an "irrelevant" issue. AB at 47. Utah
Rule of Evidence 402 precludes the admission of evidence "which is not relevant. . . . "
Rule of Evidence 401 defines relevant evidence as "having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." In violation of this rule,
Mr. Gonzales' arrears addressed no "fact that [wa]s of consequence" to this case. Utah R.
Evid. 401. The evidence simply served to label Mr. Gonzales a generally bad person. For
this reason, "[e]vidence of a witness's failure to pay his [or her] debts . . . is not probative
on the issue of truthfulness." United States v. Pedraza, 27 F.3dl515, 1529 (10th Cir.
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1994) (citing United States v. Lanza. 790 F.2d 1015, 1020 (2nd Cir. 1986)). The arrears
were immaterial. Whitley v. State, 265 So. 2d 99, 101 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972); State v.
Costner, 343 S.E.2d 241, 245 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986).
Further contrary to the State's claims, "invit[ing]M cross-examination does not
change irrelevant evidence into relevant evidence. SB at 65. Courts exclude evidence of
the failure to pay debts, including child support arrears, because that evidence lacks
"relevance." Lanza, 790 F.2d at 1020; see also Ad-Vantage Tel. Directory Consultants,
Inc. v. GTE Directories Corp., 37 F.3d 1460, 1464 (11 th Cir. 1994); Pedraza, 27 F.3d at
1529; Whitley, 265 So. 2d at 101. Mr. Gonzales' arrears did not "make the existence of
any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence." Utah R. Evid. 401. That evidence was,
therefore, inadmissible under Rule 402.
Even if the arrears had some relevance, the probative value of that evidence was
"substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury...." Utah R. Evid. 403. Evidence that is only "marginally relevant"
violates Rule 403 because "'the danger [is] great that the jury would infer more from" the
evidence than it fairly should. United States v. Novaton, 271 F.3d 968, 1006 (11 th Cir.
2001) (quoting Ad-Vantage, 37 F.3d at 1464). Here, the child support arrears raised an
entirely collateral issue that focused the jury's attention on Mr. Gonzales being a deadbeat father. State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291,295-96 (Utah 1988). His failure to pay child
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f

support added no insight on the veracity of Jessica's allegations. Accordingly, the
evidence was not admissible under Rule 403. Novaton m 271 F.3d at 1006.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Gonzales requests this Court to reverse his convictions, remand this matter for

^

a new trial, re-appoint defense counsel, and order the trial court to conduct an in camera
review of the psychological records.
(

Dated this \^_ day of March, 2004.
KENT R. HART
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
(
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1

This argument also applies to Jessica Safford's

2

testimony that I anticipate the State's going to bring out.

3

There is a police report in which the officer alluded to the

4

statement that Anjali --

5

I'm sorry.

6

MS. COOK:

7

MS. MILLER:

8

THE COURT:

9

What is her last name?
Kulkarni.
If I can just call her Anjali.
Anjali Kulkarni is the name of the

witness,

10

MS. MILLER:

11

THE COURT:

12

MS. MILLER:

Right, your Honor.

She's a juvenile.

And Ms. Safford also is included in this?
Yes.

I just want to make the court

13

aware and the State aware that these are - - o f course these are

14

juveniles.

15

talks about Anjali 1 s statement to the police where she states

16

Jessica is very reliable, she never lies, she always tells the

17

truth.

18

theft, is my understanding.

19

U.S. Supreme Court case states for impeachment purposes a

20

defense attorney has the right to cross-examine a juvenile

21

offender who has been convicted of an offence, especially one

22

of dishonesty, as I said, for impeachment purposes.

23

There is a statement in the police report which

Both those girls have a juvenile conviction of retail
And Davis versus Alaska, a 1974

So, in fact, if she states I always tell the truth

24

or Jessica states I always tell the truth, I never lie, it's

25

proper under Davis versus Alaska for me to impeach them about
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1

their juvenile conviction, at least ask them about it.

2

wanted -- you know, I didn't want to go ahead and ask about

3

that without making the Court aware that that was my intention

4

and making the State aware that that was my intention, and

5

giving you the opportunity to read the case law.

6

you're familiar with it, and the State as well.

7

THE COURT:

And I

I'm sure

So your request is, then, to make a

8

determination if those witnesses testify and if they indicate

9

that their testimony is truthful -- I'm not quite -- •

10

MS. MILLER:

11

THE COURT:

12

MS. MILLER:

If they say -I don't know if I understand it.
If either one of them gets on the stand

13

and says I always tell the truth, I never lie, I never lied

14

before, it's proper to impeach them with testimony that they

15

have committed a crime of dishonesty.

16
17
18

THE COURT:

And again the matter is in juvenile

court.
MS. MILLER:

Each of them was convicted of the retail

19

theft, your Honor.

It was prior -- sometime between January of

20

2001 and this incident.

21

THE COURT:

22

MS. ANDRUZZI:

23

The State's position?
Thank you, your Honor.

Although Ms. Miller is correct in stating that we

24

can certainly use juvenile convictions, they have to be the

25

same kind of convictions that we use in adult proceedings.
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In

1

other words, a felony or a misdemeanor involving dishonesty.

2

State v. Brown in the annotated code specifically excludes

3

theft from a crime of dishonesty.

4

theft is not a crime of dishonesty according to the Utah

5

Supreme Court, so she would not be allowed inquire into that.

6

So theft is -- a misdemeanor

Second of all, it would an improper question for us

7

to ask one witness to bolster the credibility of another.

8

we can do is inquire as to a person's reputation in the

9

community for truth an veracity, and certainly we would be

10

entitled to do that if we a can lay the proper foundation.

11

we can f t ask the witness do you always tell the truth, and we

12

don't have any intention of asking beyond the Rules of

13

Evidence.

14

THE COURT:

15

MS. MILLER:

But

Well, that -- if you want -I would just say, your Honor, Davis

16

doesn't limit impeachment with only crimes of dishonesty.

17

covers all crimes, not just those of dishonesty.

18

All

MS. ANDRUZZI:

But 609 does, your Honor.

It

It doesn't

19

limit -- whether juveniles or adults, we still have the Rules

20

of Evidence and we still have to abide by them.

21

THE COURT:

Well, I suppose we have two things to

22

consider here.

23

609 would be our operative rule.

24

defendcint.

25

One can impeach the testimony of any witness -404 I think is just for

609?

MS. ANDRUZZI:

609 is impeachment by evidence and
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conviction of a crime.
THE COURT:

609, then, is our operative rule.

And I

believe the parameters of that are that on any witness you can
inquire about a felony conviction within a ten-year period or a
crime in the same period, a crime involving dishonesty.

Maybe

I need to look at that opinion again in terms of the supreme
court decision, but it would seem to me that unless that
decision would indicate that your ability to inquire into any
offense for which there has been an adjudication in the
juvenile court, and that was based on a constitutional
underpinning, then the rule would apply and that would limit it
to crimes involving dishonesty, of which retail left is not
one.
So I suppose I could look at that supreme court
opinion, but as I say, unless there is a constitutional
underpinning there that constitutionally allows you to ask the
question of any juvenile adjudication, then I don't think you
can inquire into it.

However, there may be other basis that

would permit that to be inquired into.

To the extent that

unless there's another basis to inquire into it -- and I think
the proper procedure would be before the question is asked that
we explore the other bases prior to asking the question -- then
I don't think you are permitted to ask the question of either
of these witnesses that have been identified.
MS. MILLER:

Your Honor, may I give you the citation

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1

1

of that?

2

THE COURT:

3

MS. MILLER:

Yes.
I believe it's -- and again I can't find

4

my notes, but I'm pretty sure it's 415 U.S. 308.

5

case, and the decision is based on the sixth amendment

6

confrontation clause.

7

witnesses against you is paramount to the interest of keeping

8

the juvenile record anonymous.

9

holding.

10

THE COURT:

That's a 1974

It states that the right to confront

And that's the basis of that

Let's do this.

As I say, that seems to

11

be -- I don't have a copy of that at hand here.

12

Why don't we have you come here at 8:30 and that will give us

13

an opportunity -- also an opportunity to review this opinion,

14

and then I can hear sort of a brief further argument and then

15

make a finding, a conclusion.

16

to me that that somehow trumps the Rule 609 if you're

17

restricted to the rule, but let me read it and hear further

18

argument about it.

19
20

As I say, at this point it seems

And let's do that at 8:30 in the morning.

MS. MILLER:

Okay.

Is there anything further to consider?

21

MS. MILLER:

22

THE COURT:

23

No.
We'll be in recess until 8:30.

(Evening recess taken.)

24
25

Let's do this.
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Salt Lake City, Utah; Thursday, August 22, 2002; a.m.
P R O C E E D I N G S
(The following proceedings were held in open court
out of the presence of the jury.

Present were the

Defendant with Ms. Miller; Ms. Cook and Ms. Andruzzi
for the State.)
THE COURT:

Good morning.

We're here in matter of

the State of Utah versus Arthur Anthony Gonzales.
It appears to me the attorneys and Mr. Gonzales are
here.

The jury has not been brought in yet.

There was a

matter we ended yesterday with and it was, Ms. Miller,
your motion in limine regarding the questioning of two
juveniles who will be appearing in this trial as witnesses, and
you wish to inquire of their prior juvenile record, and that
referred us to Davis versus Alaska Supreme Court -- United
States Supreme Court opinion, and I had occasion to read that.
Let me give you a couple of minutes here if you want
to add anything to the argument you already made.
MS. MILLER:

All I would add, your Honor, is that

Davis versus Alaska supports the proposition that in state
cases as well it is appropriate on cross-examination, because
of the very important sixth amendment right to cross-examine
and confront the witnesses against you, that I would be
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1

entitled on cross-examination only to establish bias, possible

2

bias, of the witness; credibility issues and any prejudices she

3

may have by testifying against the defendant.

4

For instance, I think the case allows me to ask if

5

she is on juvenile probation, if she has been convicted of a

6

juvenile offense.

7

by the prosecution in order for me to do that.

8

effective confrontation under the sixth amendment, that's what

9

that case allows.

And I don't think the door has to be opened
To have an

That's what our own rule allows.

10

THE COURT:

11

MS. MILLER:

12

THE COURT:

Are your referring to 609?
Yes.

Thank you.

I appreciate your position, Ms. Miller.

13

I respectfully disagree.

14

started to read it, I started to recall -- I don't know if

15

there is another opinion - - i n terms of juvenile adjudications

16

they're really not convictions; they're adjudications.

17

MS. MILLER:

18

THE COURT:

My reading of that -- before I

That's right.
Whether we want to get into that pursuant

19

to Rule 609, I don't know what that opinion is, but it is not

20

Davis versus Alaska because that stands for, if you will,

21

that -- which would be true with any matter.

22

someone's prior record, given the facts of the particular case,

23

make it relevant in terms of confronting them regarding motive,

24

bias, motive on law and so forth and bias -- well, motive to

25

lie is really what it is in a particular case, then one can
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And that is if
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1

inquire into that.

And the issue in Davis was whether, given

2

the State's interest to keep juvenile records private, if you

3

will, and the embarrassment to the juvenile regarding their

4

record, whether you could inquire into that.

5

inquire into this if it f s relevant to the facts of the

6

particular case.

7

the supreme court opinion is, yes, the confrontation clause of

8

the sixth amendment, trumps, if you will, supersedes, any

9

interest the State has in keeping juvenile records private and

And one could

But could you do that with the juvenile?

And

10

the embarrassment caused to the juvenile about their prior

11

record or probationary terms, or whatever it might be.

12

that is particular to the case.

13

But what you're seeking here is sort of a modification of the

14

general rule.

15

witnesses regardless of whether their conviction is relevant or

16

not in the facts of the particular case.

17

made, if you will, that if you have been convicted of a felony

18

or crime involving dishonesty, that as a general proposition

19

you can inquire into that.

20

You have to •-- you don't have to show any relevance in the

21

facts in the particular case.

22

But

That was relevant in the case.

609 is a general rule that applies to all

A decision has been

It doesn't have to be relevant.

So I think what we're dealing with is Davis dealt

23

with relevance of a prior criminal situation in the context of

24

the facts of a particular case, and Rule 609 is the general

25

proposition in terms of what you can inquire into.
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And in any

event, like I say, I think there is an opinion that would give
us the proposition that you can inquire into a juvenile's prior
record, vis-a-vis 609, if it complied with 609, and that is
therefs an adjudication of an offense of the equivalent of
which was a felony or a crime of dishonesty.

But my

understanding is that these two juveniles don't fit into either
of those categories.

Their offense was not a felony under the

adult statute, or a crime of dishonesty, being a retail theft.
Consequently, for those reasons, your motion is
denied and you may not inquiry pursuant to 609 of these
juveniles regarding that prior record.
MS. MILLER:

Your Honor, may I just have the benefit

of the record for purposes of appeal, if there is one?
THE COURT:

Well, you can give your argument to the

Court of Appeals.
MS. MILLER:

Well, I have to preserve it in the trial

court.
THE COURT:
your motion.

You preserved your objection.

You preserved it.

You made

I have given you the reasons

why and you can write a very lengthy brief to the court of
appeals in terms of the further argument.

I think the record

is clear.
Let's call the jury in and begin this trial.
MS. MILLER:

Your Honor, on the record I will need to

invoke the
Exclusionary Rule. Do you want me to do that now or
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